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Why Historical Emissions Should Count
Lukas H. Meyer*
Abstract
This Article argues for three ways in which historical emissions should count for the fair
distribution of the benefits and burdens of responding to climate change among currently living
people. First, historical emissions should count as a matter of ideal distributive justice if and
insofar as their consequences can be considered beneficial to currently living and future people.
Second, it is d#icult to justify compensatoy measures for damages caused by historical
emissions for three main reasons: the non-identity problem, past people's limited knowledge of
the long-term consequences of the emissions they caused, and the problem of attributing
responsibilityforpastpeople's actions to currently living people. Rather than regarding climate
damages primarily as a reason for compensation for wrongdoing, we should view them primariy
as a justification for redistribution due to undeserved benefits and harms. Third, historical
emissions play an important role informing the expectation ofpeople in the developed countries
to be able to cause emissions at the current level. If we were in a position to implement a fair,
effective and legitimately imposed global climate regime we should not unnecessarily frustrate
that expectation.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Intergenerational justice, namely, what currently living people owe to
future people and the question'of how to interpret the normative significance of
what past people did,' is of central importance in providing an interpretation of
what ought to be done to respond to climate change in the present. Answers to
questions concerning the past and the future are relevant for determining what
currently living people ought to do today. In the climate-justice debate, the time
dimensions past, present, and future are interlinked in interesting ways.
This Article addresses two questions: First, how should we take into
account historical emissions and their beneficial consequences in initially
distributing emission rights among currently living people? I will argue first, in
Section II, that as a matter of ideal distributive justice, historical emissions
should count if and insofar as their consequences can be interpreted as beneficial
to currently living and future people. In their book Climate Change Justice, Eric A.
Posner and David Weisbach do not address this issue.2
My second question concerns who should pay for the damages that are
caused by (historical) emissions, especially assuming that people (taken
individually and collectively) have not stayed and will not stay within their fair
shares. In Section III, I agree with Posner and Weisbach in arguing that
compensation payments are difficult to justify, given the reasons they discuss in
Chapter 5 of Climate Change Justice. Insofar as arguments actually succeed in
justifying some compensatory measures, they are likely only to justify them for
parts of those who cause or suffer from climate change. However, I add what I
take to be an important reason for believing that the compensatory rationale is
1 For an explication of this understanding of intergenerational justice see Lukas H. Meyer,
Intergenerational Justice, in Edward N. Zalta, ed, The Stanford Engclopedia of Philosophy (2008), online at
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2010/entries/ustice-intergenerational/ (visited Oct 23,
2012).
2 See generally Eric A. Posner and David Weisbach, Clmate ChangeJustice (Princeton 2010).
3 See id at 103-08. As explained below, the two reasons are that past people were ignorant about
the long-term consequences of their actions that have had emissions as a side-product and that
currently living people cannot be said to be responsible for what others did before they came into
existence.
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limited in the case of intergenerational relations: to the extent that the
contingency of future people's existence and personal identity depend upon
currently living people's decisions and actions, common notions of harming and
benefitting are not applicable for interpreting the effects of these actions. This
concerns both the effects of currently living people's actions on future people's
well-being and the effects of past people's actions on the well-being of currently
living people. Further, I note that currently living people might be said to owe
compensatory measures to future people for having failed to fulfill their duties
to them. I also will suggest that rather than regarding climate damages primarily
as a reason for compensation for wrongdoing, we should view them primarily as
a justification for redistribution due to undeserved benefits and harms. Leveling
off the highly unequal effects of historical emissions can be a legitimate concern
for distributive justice. Finally, I point to the effects of historical emissions for
forming the expectation of people in the developed countries to be able to cause
emissions at the current level. I suggest that we should not unnecessarily
frustrate this expectation for arriving at a fair, effective, and legitimately imposed
global climate regime.
II. How SHOULD WE DISTRIBUTE EMISSIONS?
The outline of an argument for distributing emissions has a number of
steps, including the following basic four steps, the first three of which I
introduce in Section II.A. In the next two subsections I will discuss the
implication of my view for the distribution of emission rights.
A. How to Distribute Emissions? Three Presuppositions
First, we need to argue for a global limitation of emissions and thus for a
maximum of still-permissible emissions. I have argued elsewhere that currently
living people have to respect the basic rights of future people as a matter of
intergenerational justice. The applicable context-relevant notion of justice is best
understood as a version of sufficientarianism that attributes high priority to the
protection of the basic rights of all people whenever they live.4 Such a minimal
4 I have argued that we have special and strong reasons for a sufficientarian conception of
intergenerational justice. See generally Lukas H. Meyer, Past and Future: The Case of a Threshold
Notion ofHarm, in Lukas H. Meyer, Stanley L. Paulson, and Thomas W. Pogge, eds, Rihts, Culture,
and the Law: Themes from the Legal and Podcal Philosophy of Joseph Rat 143 (Oxford 2003); Lukas H.
Meyer, Intergeneraionelle Suffltiengerechfgkeit, in Nils Goldschmidt, ed, Generationengerecbigkeit 281
(Tiibingen 2009). I presuppose a pluralism of conceptions of justice reflecting different types of
relations among people. The reasons for intergenerational sufficientarianism reflect the non-
contingent special features of intergenerational relations. For relations among contemporaries,
more demanding principles can be shown to be plausible; for inter- and transnational relations, I
propose the priority view, described below. See also Lukas H. Meyer and Dominic Roser,
Winter 2013
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understanding of what intergenerational justice requires can contribute to
specifying a maximum of still-permissible emissions.
Second, we need to clarify why we care about a fair distribution of the
remaining permissible emissions. The goods in question are the benefits that
people realize in carrying out actions that unavoidably have emissions as a side-
product. Today almost all of our activities, such as producing industrial
commodities, farming, or flying, have emissions as their unavoidable side-
product.' Causing emissions is a conditlio sine qua non of most of our actions that
potentially contribute to our well-being. While we have no reason to be
interested in emissions as such we have strong reasons in being concerned about
our well-being and thus in being allowed to cause emissions so long as emissions
are an unavoidable product of our actions. Accordingly, I propose to understand
"distributing emissions" as the shorthand for distributing the permissions to
perform emission-generating activities that regularly benefit those who engage in
these activities. These permissions are often referred to as "Emission Rights."'
Distributing emissions therefore stands for distributing the benefits of engaging
in emission-generating activities by distributing emission rights.
Third, we need to specify the principle according to which we judge the
distribution of emissions. For that I propose the priority view.' According to the
priority view, benefitting people matters regardless of how much others have,
but we should give greater weight to benefits for people who are badly off than
to benefits for people who are well-off. One plausible version of the priority
view specifies the following prioritarian principle of distribution: People ought
to receive more benefits when they are worse off, and we ought to maximize the
total sum of the weighted benefits.
Clearly, the priority view is not open to many of the objections advanced
against a strictly egalitarian understanding of justice. According to the
prioritarian principle as stated, equality as such does not matter. The view thus is
not open to the leveling-down objection. A strictly egalitarian position holds that
equality is of intrinsic value, implying that we have a reason to worsen the state
of better off persons for the sake of equality even though it is better for no one.
Many find such leveling down objectionable.' Even if prioritarians do not see
Distributive Justice and Climate Change: The Allocation ofEmission Rigbts, 28 Analyse & Kritik 223, 233-
45 (2006).
s Emissions can also be beneficial owing to the climate change they cause. Some people benefit
from a warming world.
6 For an explication of "emission rights" see Meyer and Roser, Distributive Jusice at 227-29 (cited in
note 4).
7 See Derek Parfit, Equa,6y and Priority, 10 Ratio 202, 213 (1997).
8 See generally Nils Holtug, Egatarianism and the relling Down Obfection, 58 Analysis 166 (1998).
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anything intrinsically bad in social, economic, and other differences, their
priority view often has egalitarian implications. The priority view accepts that if
X is worse off than Y, we have at least a prima facie reason for promoting the
well-being of X rather than of Y. Thus, in many cases the prioritarian principle
will prescribe an equal distribution of the goods in question but it can also justify
giving more of a good to a person for two reasons: first, if that person is worse
off and, second, given that the priority view is an aggregative view, if the person
can make better use of the good in terms of total benefits realized. Below I will
discuss whether and how these two reasons for an unequal distribution can be
shown to be relevant when we investigate the question of what the priority view
implies for the distribution of emission rights.
B. How to Distribute Emissions Ahistorically
I will argue, as a matter of applying the priority view to the distribution of
emission rights, that historical emissions should count if and insofar as their
consequences can be interpreted as beneficial to currently living and future
people. I develop the argument in two steps. In this section I show that when we
disregard past emissions of currently living people and historical emissions of
previously living people, the priority view can plausibly be understood to require
an equal per capita distribution of emission rights. Then, in Section II.C, I show
how accounting for the large differences in historical emissions justifies an
unequal distribution of emission rights.
How should we go about applying a prioritarian principle to the
distribution of emission rights? One option, which I will adopt, is to consider
the fair distribution of emission rights in complete isolation from the
distribution of all other goods. A second option would be to consider the
currently existing highly unequal distribution of all goods (or at least all goods
that are considered relevant from the perspective of distributive justice)' as given
and, then, to distribute emission rights in order to even out the existing unequal
distribution of all justice-relevant goods. A third option would be to consider the
distribution of emission rights in conjunction with the distribution of all other
goods that a theory of global justice aims at allocating fairly.
All three options are problematic. If we followed the first option generally
and distributed each single good in isolation from all others, we would not
necessarily arrive at an overall distribution of goods that would satisfy a
prioritarian principle: the different goods (also owing to their unequal
distribution) interact with each other in numerous ways that are relevant for the
9 Alternative understandings of the subject matter of theories of justice could include: all goods
taken together insofar as they affect the well-being of people or the design of institutions affecting
the distribution of those goods.
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benefits that people receive from having access to them. If we followed the
second option and took the distribution of all other goods into account by
taking that distribution as given, this is likely to prescribe giving all emission
rights to the global poor, that is, to those who have very little of the other goods;
aiming at realizing an overall just distribution of goods by fairly distributing only
one single good seems less than convincing. The problem with the third option
is that investigating the question of what the application of the prioritarian
principle requires for each single good when considered in conjunction with all
other goods is so complex that we will not be able to specify what this would
imply for the distribution of any single good and, thus, specifically, for the
distribution of emission rights.
I propose to follow the first option for pragmatic reasons. In our non-ideal
world it is not an issue of much political relevance how to globally distribute all
natural resources (or all goods in general), but the issue of how to distribute
emission rights is one that we are faced with. If, accounting for the rights of
future people, we have strong reasons to put a cap on global emissions, a good
that earlier was available in unlimited quantities is turned into a scarce good, and,
thus, we are confronted with the question of how to distribute this newly limited
commodity. If we determine how to distribute this good in isolation from all
other goods, we might later on have to change our prescription in light of the
consequences that its distribution has for the just distribution of other goods
independently or all other goods bundled."o
In section II.A, I distinguish two justifications for an unequal distribution
according to the priority view, which, in the typical case, would simply demand
an equal per capita distribution of these rights. The priority view justifies the
unequal distribution of a fixed amount of a good in two cases only: first, if some
of the recipients are worse off than others; second, if some of the recipients can
extract more benefits out of the particular good than others." Are these two
reasons for an unequal distribution relevant when we apply the prioritarian
principle to emission rights in isolation (in other words, by abstracting from the
existing background distribution of all other goods)? No, they are not, since
both justifications are excluded when we consider the distribution of emission
rights in isolation from the distribution of all other goods. First, ignoring the
distribution of other goods makes identifying better off or worse off recipients
10 See also John Rawls, A Theory of Jusice 8 (Oxford 1971) (describing his methodology of initially
limiting the subject matter of his investigation in order to make remaining problems more
tractable).
11 A third legitimate reason for inequality arises once the free choices of individuals are taken into
account. The priority view can take them into account by catering to the idea of responsibility,
that is, respecting the value of free choice even if this should alter the optimal prioritarian
distribution.
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impossible. Second, how many benefits individuals can draw from an emission
right depends on their access to other goods, such as wealth, the natural
environment, or the industrial structure of their country. Thus, when the
distribution of all other goods is regarded as irrelevant, the priority view would
prescribe a distribution of equal emission rights among individual persons, that
is, equal per capita emission rights. In the remainder of this Article, I rely on the
conclusion that applying the prioritarian principle according to the first option
and without taking the past into account speaks in favor of equal per capita
emission rights.
C. Accounting for Historical Emissions in the Distribution of
Emission Rights
Historical emissions have highly unequal consequences for currently (and
future) living people. Their consequences are both beneficial and harmful. The
level of past and current emissions strongly correlates with the level of wealth.
Highly industrialized countries are causally responsible for more than three times
as many emissions between 1850 and 2002 than developing countries. 2 Even
though industrialization in today's high-income countries has caused a large part
of the build-up in greenhouse gases, people of the developing countries-in
particular those living in the future-will suffer disproportionately more from
climate change. And, of course, far more people live in developing countries."
Given that historical emissions have both beneficial and harmful
consequences, it seems plausible to distinguish two ways in which historical
emissions can be considered normatively significant. First, their beneficial
consequences can be considered relevant for what may count as a just
distribution of the remaining permissible emissions among currently living
people. This concerns how the mitigation burden should be distributed globally.
Who should beat what costs of reducing emissions to the justifiable quota?
Second, the harmful consequences of historical emissions are relevant for what
may count as a just allocation of the costs of adapting to climate change that was
not avoided or has to be considered unavoidable-especially considering that
people did cause more emissions than they were entitled to and have not stayed
within their fair shares. Here we are concerned with how the adaptation burden
should be distributed globally.
12 See Kevin Baumert, Timothy Herzog, and Jonathan Pershing, Naugating the Numhers: Greenhouse
Gas Data and Intemational Climate Polip 32 (World Resources Institute 2005).
13 See United Nations Population Fund, State of World Population 2007 (UNFPA 2007), online at
http://www.unfpa.org/swp/swpmain.htm (visited Oct 25, 2012).
Winter 2013
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While the issues of mitigation and adaptation are often linked together in
political negotiations, we can think of them as separate issues. As suggested in
Sections II.A and II.B, distributing emission rights (the mitigation issue) can be
considered an issue of distributive justice. Many theorists consider paying for the
climate change damages (the adaptation issue) an issue of compensatory justice.14
In the end I will argue that it should be considered mostly an issue of
distributive justice as well.
Should the beneficial consequences of historical emissions be considered
relevant for what may count as a just distribution of the remaining permissible
emissions among currently living people? If so, how? We can distinguish several
major objections against counterbalancing past emissions:"
1. In the case of the US, more than half of its past emissions were caused
prior to 1975. Posner and Weisbach point out that more than half of Americans
alive today were born after 1975, and more than 27 percent are today younger
than twenty years old." These young Americans may object: "Why should I be
responsible for the sins of my ancestors?" The objection states that currently
living people should not be made responsible for the acts of their ancestors and
should not be put at a disadvantage simply because the people inhabiting their
country before them emitted too much.
2. Posner and Weisbach suggest that "we should distinguish between
greenhouse gas emissions that occurred before the problem of anthropogenic
climate change was widely known, or before that point at which reasonable
people would have acknowledged the problem, and later emissions." 7 For the
time before, many people may object: "We didn't know about the greenhouse
effect." The objection states that one can only be blamed for a certain act if one
knows-or should know-of the harmful effects of the act. Yet, it is debatable
whether until recently the knowledge of the harmful effect of emissions was
sufficiently widespread."
3. There is a third general objection that Posner and Weisbach do not
mention. It interprets the non-identity problem for the consequences of past
actions on the composition of currently and future living people in the following
14 See, for example, Maxine Burkett, Climate Reparaions, 10 Melb J Intl L 509, 510 (2009); see also
Posner and Weisbach, Climate Change Jusice at 99-118 (cited in note 2).
15 Of course, there are also practical difficulties: one is in estimating past emissions and another is in
bringing it into the negotiating process because it is neither a simple (but rather a complex)
proposal nor is it one that serves the interests of those with the most bargaining power.
16 Posner and Weisbach, Climate Change Justice at 103 (cited in note 2).
17 Id at 104.
18 See id at 104, 110; see also id at 110-16 (discussing the "culpability problem").
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way: no one can claim to be worse off or better off than she would be had
another climate policy been pursued in a sufficiently distant past.1 9
These objections also differ in their scope. The first objection is relevant
for emissions by people who are now dead; the second objection concerns
emissions, for example, before the first Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change (IPCC) report in 1990;20 and the third objection can be raised with
respect to emissions (and policies influencing emissions) early enough to be a
determining factor in the number and identity of people living today.
These objections do not succeed in showing that historical emissions
cannot be considered relevant for what may count as a just distribution of the
remaining permissible emissions among currently living people. Rather, we can
take part of past emissions into account and in at least two ways that are not
open to the three objections. The first relies on an interpretation of the
circumstances under which people are bearers of claims to a fair share of the
remaining permissible emissions.
We could demand that the equal per capita distribution of emission rights
(or some other criterion of a fair distribution) is realized at a point in time, for
example, every day, or over the whole lifespan of individuals. In this context
considering the whole lifespan of individuals seems far more plausible.21 People
do not cause emissions from time to time. It is not as if the need to cause
19 The non-identity problem precludes us from saying that future people are harmed (or benefitted)
by actions that are necessary conditions of their existence as the individuals they will be. See
Derek Parfit, Reasons and Persons 351-79 (Clarendon 1984). This is the case ifwe understand harm
in the sense of being made worse off by an action than one would otherwise be. There is,
however, another conception of harm that successfully evades the non-identity problem: by
claiming that people can be said to be harmed by actions that make them fall below a certain pre-
specified threshold, future people can also be said to be harmed by actions that are a necessary
condition of their existence. For a treatment of these issues, see generally Meyer, Intergenerational
justice (cited in note 1).
20 J.T. Houghton, G.J. Jenkins, and J.J. Ephraums, eds, Cfimate Change: The IPCC Scientific Assessment
(IPCC 1990), online at http://www.ipcc.ch/publications-anddata/publicationsipcc-
firstassessment_1990_.wg.shtml#.UlmDrsWHKSo (visited Oct 25, 2012). See generally Axel
Gosseries, Historical Emissions and Free Riding, 11 Ethical Perspectives 36, 40 (2004) (listing and
discussing some salient dates that might serve as an alternative to 1990: 1840 (as proposed by the
Brazilian Proposal), 1896 (first scientific text on the greenhouse effect by Svante Arrhenius), 1967
(first serious modeling exercises), and 1995 (the second IPCC report)). One might also add the
IPCC reports from 2001 and 2007 as well as the very beginning of industrialization in the
eighteenth century. Rather than attempting to determine a point in time when it was reasonable to
attribute the relevant knowledge conditions to many or most people in the highly industrialized
countries, we might investigate the question as a matter of degree and distinguish among
individual people and actors. Thanks to Stephen Gardiner for outlining this alternative.
21 For discussion, see Nils Holtug and Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen, An Introduction to Contemporary
Egalitarianism, in Nils Holtug and Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen, eds, Egalitarianism: New Essays on the
Nature and Value ofEquallty (Oxford 2007), and Thomas Hurka, Perfectionism 9-22 (Oxford 1993).
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emissions arises sporadically. Rather, people cannot avoid engaging in emission-
generating activities. To cause emissions is a prerequisite for people pursuing
their projects and in all phases of life. This will remain the case for the
foreseeable future. Unless we have a technological revolution that would allow
us to avoid, compensate for, or extract greenhouse gases in high quantities and
at small cost to ourselves, the net level of emissions caused will be strongly
correlated with the level of welfare that people realize.
Thus, currently living people will cause emissions for all their lives. If their
claim to a fair share refers to a fair share over their whole lifespan, then the
emissions that occurred during the life of the presently living have to be taken
into account. To be sure, this is only a small part of past emissions. As explained
in Section II.A, a fair share of emissions stands for a fair share of the benefits of
engaging in emission-generating activities. People in the highly industrialized
countries already enjoyed many benefits from their own emission-generating
activities during their lifetimes. If we want to achieve an equal per capita
distribution of benefits from emission-generating activities, then a larger part of
the permissions to perform emission-generating activities that regularly benefit
those who engage in these activities should go to most people in the developing
countries. This is the first way of taking into account (one small part of) past
emissions in determining a just distribution of the remaining permissible
emissions among currently living people and for arguing for above-average per
capita emission rights for most people in the developing countries on the basis
of the inequality of past emissions currently living people caused over their
lifetime.
As these past emissions are the past emissions that currently living people
caused themselves, the first and third objections obviously do not speak against
taking them into account. However, people might well have caused some of
their past emissions in a state of ignorance with respect to how, by acting in
these ways, they contribute to climate change. So we might want to rely on the
second objection and argue in favor of excluding those past emissions on the
grounds that the ignorance of past polluters does not allow attributing
responsibility for those emissions to them. This would be a mistake, as the
rationale of the argument as presented for their inclusion does not justify higher
emission rights for people in the developing countries as compensation for past
wrongdoing of people in the industrialized countries. It justifies them by the idea
of equalizing emission benefits over the lifetime of individuals. For the
distributional rationale it matters that an individual already has used up (some or
Vol 13 No. 2606
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most of) his share. It does not matter whether he did so knowingly and
wrongfully.
As argued throughout, we are not interested in emissions as such but in the
benefits that people realize from emission-generating activities. The second
justifiable way of taking (part of) past emissions into account for the
determination of the presently fair shares interprets the relevant benefits as
including those from emission-generating activities by past people.
Industrialization pursued by our predecessors has yielded many benefits up to
today, and, important for our context, many more for most people living in the
industrialized countries than for most people of the developing countries. These
benefits include the provision of infrastructure, for example, schools, hospitals,
streets, and railroads, which were built before those presently alive were born.
That the products of the emission-generating activities by people who are now
dead unequally benefit the currently living has to be taken into account when we
distribute benefits from emission-generating activities among currently living
people.23
Looked at in this way, no responsibility for the emission-generating
activities of past people is attributed to currently living people and, of course,
the question of what currently living people know about climate change and its
causes does not arise either. Thus, the first two objections obviously do not
speak against this way of taking past emissions into account. But we might want
to object to the inclusion of benefits from past people's activities on the basis of
the third objection that reflects the non-identity problem. This would be a
mistake, as the rationale of the argument for their inclusion does not rely on the
claim that those individuals who today live in developing countries are worse off
than they would be without emissions in the distant past. Neither do we claim
that the people of the developed countries benefit from industrialization in the
distant past in the sense of being better off than they would be had there been
no industrialization. This is what the non-identity problem implies: nobody can
claim to be better off than she would have been without industrialization, since
if a different economic development path had been pursued, most likely, she
would not exist today. However, this is fully compatible with the observation
that the circumstances in which people find themselves since their conception
can be more or less beneficial to them. People realize benefits owing to the fact
of being brought up in an industrialized world while others do not enjoy such
22 This approximate conclusion has to be qualified somewhat as a matter of transitory justice. See
Section III.
23 For the reasons stated in Section II.B I assume that we should consider the distribution of this
good, in other words, the benefits from emission-generating activities, in isolation from all other
goods.
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circumstances. It is true for each of them that they could have fared differently;
had a person born into the highly industrialized world been taken away after his
birth and transferred to a slum in the developing countries, he would have been
worse off than being raised in the developed world. The second way of taking
past emissions into account relies on more or fewer benefits from emission-
generating activities being passed on to currently living people since their
conception. Thus, according to prioritarian standards, people who have received
fewer, typically people in developing countries, should get a disproportionate
share of emission rights because others, typically people in highly industrialized
countries, have already received a large part of their share by inheritance from
their ancestors.
My conclusion is that certain parts of past emissions should be taken into
account in distributing emission rights, namely, at least those past emissions that
occurred during the lifetime of the presently living and those past emissions that
were side-products of benefits that are still around today.24 The two ways of
taking into account past emissions I have defended will not allow us to take into
account all inequality in historical emissions; those emissions that belonged to
people who are now dead and that yield no benefits for the currently living have
no normative significance from this perspective.
There is a general reason why the three objections do not pose any
problem for the two ways of taking past emissions into account. All three
objections rely on the idea that lower-than-equal shares of emission rights for
people in the highly industrialized countries must be grounded in the idea that
the wrongdoer (or the beneficiary of a wrongful action) must return something
to those who are harmed. The idea of compensation so understood is present in
the three objections as follows. The third objection, the non-identity problem,
denies that past emissions can be seen as harmful and, thus, if there is no harm,
then no compensation is appropriate. It also denies that some are made better
off through emissions than they would be otherwise and so there is no
beneficiary. The second objection, ignorance about the climate problem, claims
that even if past emissions could be seen as harmful, they still cannot be seen as
wrongful; as such, no compensation is owed. The first objection, to the concept
of being responsible for the deeds of one's ancestors, goes further in stating that
even if past emissions were both harmful and wrongful, still, compensation is
not owed, the reason being that compensation is something that the wrongdoer
himself must pay and not his descendants.
24 Simon Caney, Environmental Degradation, Reparations, and the Moral Signgicance of History, 37 J Soc Phil
464, 470 (2006) (arguing that evening out inequalities in emissions over time relies on a collectivist
framework). By focusing on the benefits of past emissions enjoyed by the presently living, I
provide an interpretation that does not rely on a collectivist framework.
Vol 13 No. 2608
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Even if the objections were based on sound premises when applied to
other positions, they are not relevant for my argument since the two ways of
taking past emissions into account in no way rely on the idea of compensation
for past wrongs. They consider the distribution of emission rights as a problem
of distributive justice (as described in Section II.B), and so understood we do
not refer to harm or wrong at all. Rather, the idea is to equally distribute the
benefits associated with emission-generating activities among the presently living
over their whole lifetimes. As I have argued, owing to the unequal inheritance of
such benefits and the unequal benefits people have realized through their own
actions, we will not achieve this goal unless we give most people of the
developing countries higher shares of emission rights.
III. CLAIMS TO COMPENSATION OWING TO
CLIMATE DAMAGES?
The three objections are normatively relevant when we attempt to provide
an answer to a different question: not the question of how to fairly distribute the
benefits of emission-generating activities, but rather the question of how to fairly
deal with the bad consequences of emission-generating activities. Who should
pay for the damages that are caused by historical emissions, especially assuming
that people have not stayed and will not stay within their fair share? These costs
have two aspects: first, the climate damages themselves, and second, the
adaptation costs necessary to minimize, or at least decrease, climate damages-
this is because the impact of emissions not only depends on the level of climate
change they produce, but also on the human reaction to this change.
I will suggest that rather than regarding climate damages primarily as a
reason for compensation for wrongdoing, we should view them primarily as a
reason for redistribution due to undeserved benefits and harms. One way to
distinguish between the basic idea of redistribution and compensation starts with
the premise that there is some baseline distribution of goods that is just. This
baseline distribution is on the one hand determined by a certain criterion (such
as the priority view, egalitarianism, or sufficientarianism2 6) and on the other by
changes to the distribution (as determined by the criterion) that someone
experiences as a result of his own responsible (and non-wrongful) choices.
Deviations from this baseline then call for two different kinds of reactions. If
the reaction the deviation calls for is based on the wrongfulness of what
occurred, we are operating in the realm of compensatory justice. If the reaction
25 I do not believe that these objections are wholly based on sound premises. See, for example,
Meyer, IntergeneraionalJusice at § 3.1 (cited in note 1) (discussing the non-identity problem).
26 One might take the status quo as a given and declare it to be the relevant baseline. I criticize and
reject this view in Meyer and Roser, Allocaion ofEmission Rigbts at 229-32 (cited in note 4).
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the deviation calls for is based on the idea of evening out undeserved benefits or
harms (which are due to luck, for example, or harmful, but non-wrongful,
actions), we are operating in the realm of distributive justice.
Then the basic question becomes: Which duties to pay for adaptation to
climate change are based on the wrongfulness of what was done, in other words,
which duties can be traced back to the compensatory rationale? Any duties that
cannot be traced back in this way will fall into the category of the redistributive
rationale and will be regarded as grounded in the objective of leveling off
undeserved benefits and harms. The size of such payments is determined by
whether payments for adaptation costs are justified on the basis of the
compensatory or redistributive rationale.
Two remarks are appropriate. First, not everybody regards evening out
undeserved benefits and harms through redistribution as a moral imperative;27
and some, namely sufficientarians, regard it as an imperative only up to the point
where everybody has "enough." I will assume that undeserved benefits and
harms should be evened out according to prioritarian standards, but the basic
point of distinguishing compensatory and redistributive rationales remains
interesting also for theorists who do not see undeserved benefits and harms as
giving weighty reasons for redistribution.
Second, I am working with a narrow notion of compensation. Payments
that are due to non-wrongful harm-doing have also been labeled compensation
payments.2 8 All I argue is that it is an interesting question in the intergenerational
context of climate change to separate payments based on wrongfulness from
those not based on wrongfulness and that the latter can be seen as based on
concerns different from the former, namely redistributive and not compensatory
concerns.
I agree with Posner and Weisbach that compensation payments for climate
damages are difficult to justify and for a good number of reasons.2 9 We can
distinguish several versions of compensatory payments depending on who has
the duty to provide them. The most natural duty-bearer for compensatory
payments is the emitter of wrongful emissions himself. I will call this the Emitter
Pays Principle (EPP).30 A second version of compensatory payments, the
27 See, for example, Peter Cane, Advah's Acddents, Compensation and the Law 355 (Butterworth 5th ed
1993).
28 Joel Feinberg, Voluntag Euthanasia and the Inalienable Right to life, 7 Phil & Pub Aff 93, 102 (1978).
29 See Posner and Weisbach, Climate Change Justice at 99-118 (cited in note 2).
30 The Emitter Pays Principle is restricted to wrongful emitters and is to be distinguished from
interpretations of "polluter pays principles" (also, "strict liability principles") or Moellendorf's
causal principle that makes any emitter-whether wrongful or not-pay. See Darrell Moellendorf,
CosmopofitanJustice 98 (Westview 2002).
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Beneficiary Pays Principle, identifies the beneficiary of wrongful emissions as
responsible for providing compensation. A third version ascribes the duty to pay
compensation to the wrongdoing community: a Community Pays Principle.
I will briefly discuss only the EPP. There is not much doubt that in general
(that is, disregarding whether it can be usefully applied to the climate change
problem), the idea of such compensation is very well supported by our moral
intuitions. This is in contrast to the Beneficiary Pays Principle and the
Community Pays Principle, where the principle itself is clearly disputed, even
apart from its application to the climate change problem. So my question is: Can
the EPP justify compensatory payments for the specific case of climate
damages?
There are five basic problems for justifying compensatory payments in the
context of climate damages. Posner and Weisbach discuss the first three. In
analyzing the normative relevance of received benefits caused by historical
emissions we have already come across the problem of blameless ignorance and
the non-identity problem (problems three, four, and five, below).
a. Potential payers might be dead.3'
b. Potential payers might not have exceeded their fair shares.3 2
c. Potential payers might have been blamelessly ignorant.33
d. Potential recipients might, due to the non-identity problem, only be
said to be harmed according to a threshold conception of harm.
e. Potential payers might, also due to the non-identity problem, not be
said to have benefited.
If the EPP is put to the service of justifying compensatory payments, one
has to identify wrongful emitters and wrongfully harmed persons. Someone
emits wrongfully if, first, he exceeded his fair share and second, he knew or was
liable to know about the harmfulness of his emissions. Someone is wrongfully
harmed by emissions if he either is worse off due to wrongful emissions than he
would otherwise be or falls below the specified threshold of harm due to
wrongful emissions (or both). If all emitters could legitimately be excused by
ignorance, then EPP cannot identify any wrongful emitter at all to pay
compensation payments. If not, it can still only ascribe compensatory duties to
some (even though there are many more persons who are causally responsible
for climate change today and in the future). The EPP also has difficulties in
identifying wronged persons; they can only be said to be wronged, and thus be
31 See Posner and Weisbach, Climate Change Justice at 102 (cited in note 2).
32 See id at 109-15.
33 See id at 104.
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the rightful recipient of compensatory payments, if we can defend a solution to
the non-identity problem. Elsewhere I have argued that the most plausible
response to the non-identity problem relies on a threshold conception of harm
in conjunction with a sufficientarian understanding of the threshold.
Accordingly, wronged persons are rightful recipients of compensatory payments
if they fall below the sufficientarian threshold.34
We can conclude that insofar as arguments actually succeed in justifying
some compensatory measures, they are likely only to justify them for parts of
those who cause or suffer from climate change. However, I would like to add
three qualifications. First, many of us do not seem to fulfill our intergenerational
duties of justice vis- -vis future people with respect to climate justice. Currently
living people stand under such duties if it is the case that they can be said to
know not only about the seriously harmful consequences of their emission-
generating activities for future people, but also about effective measures to
protect future people's basic rights and that implementing these policies is not
over-demanding on them. Elsewhere I have argued that this is not the case.
Looked at in terms of consequences, an individual is highly unlikely to have any
morally better alternative to continuing to emit at a level that is far above the just
per capita level; any level of emissions she chooses is most likely to have the
same or very similar impact in terms of violations of rights of future people-in
other words, none or very close to none.36 If currently living people stood under
intergenerational duties of justice vis-A-vis future people with respect to climate
justice, then currently living people's having failed to fulfill their duties vis-A-vis
future people would constitute harmful wrongdoing.37 If so, and if currently
living people failed to fulfill their duties vis-a-vis future people, they would owe
future people compensatory measures that prevent future people from
becoming victims of their wrongful harm-doing.
Second, the fact that the developing countries have to carry such a large
share of climate damages seems to be a situation that asks for some kind of
response. And of course, compensation (in the narrow sense of wrongdoers
paying something to the wronged persons on the grounds of the injustice
committed) is not the only kind of possible response. Rather, given that many
effects of climate change can be seen as undeserved harms-and harms that go
34 See generally Meyer, Past and Future, in Meyer, Paulson, and Pogge, eds, Rsghts, Cultu, and the Iaw
at 143 (cited in note 4); Meyer, Intergenerational Justice at 5 3.1 (cited in note 1).
35 See Lukas H. Meyer and Pranay Sanklecha, Inditidual Expectations and Climate justice, 33 Analyse &
Kritik 449, 462-64 (2011).
36 This might even be true for collective actors with as large a share of global emissions as the US,
depending on our account of how its emissions contribute to the harm caused.
37 See Posner and Weisbach, Climate Change Justice at 108-09 (cited in note 2).
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along with undeserved benefits for other persons-leveling off such effects on
the basis of a concern for distributive justice seems an equally plausible
response. If principles of distributive justice, and in particular the priority view,
do apply at a global level, these principles can also be applied to the distribution
of duties of paying adaptation costs to those who suffer from climate damages.
In assuming that the priority view is the correct kind of principle for distributing
emission rights, I presupposed that principles of distributive justice do apply at
the global level."
Consequently, I believe that principles of distributive justice can also be
applied (at least to some degree) to the distribution of duties of paying
adaptation costs to those who suffer from climate damages. Of course, to
common moral intuition, demands of compensatory justice seem to have a
stronger force than demands simply based on evening out undeserved benefits
or harms, particularly at the global level.39 I do not necessarily want to question
that view; compensation payments might have a certain priority before
redistributive concerns. However, in the context of climate damages,
compensation payments are only justifiable for such a small part of the problem
that it is appropriate to primarily direct attention to the redistributive demands.
The focus must be turned to equitably sharing undeserved benefits and harms
rather than focusing on compensating wronged persons in view of the limited
applicability of the latter enterprise.
The third qualification reflects another perspective on the normative
relevance of historical emissions that, I believe, is compatible with what I have
argued in this paper. People living in the highly industrialized countries and
elsewhere have formed expectations about the level of emissions that they may
cause that is far above what they are entitled to according to the equal per capita
view of emission rights, and even more so when that view takes into account
historical emissions. The expectation has been formed partially but necessarily
by the collective level of historical emissions of their political societies. In
pursuing life plans and projects that are open to them, people as members of
highly industrialized countries typically engage in activities that have far more
emissions as their side-product than the ideal view of a just distribution of
emission rights would allow them to cause. If, under the current circumstances,
their expectation-to be able to emit far more than ideal justice would allow-
could be shown to be legitimate and permissible, this would identify a
consideration relevant to determining how one ought to go about arriving at an
ideal collective solution. The expectation would have to be taken into account by
38 See, for example, Thomas W. Pogge, Reai ng Rawls (Cornell 1989).
39 See David Miller, Holding Nations Responsible, 114 Ethics 240, 241 n 1 (2004); Gosseries, Historical
Emissions at 55 (cited in note 20).
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establishing the authoritatively imposed global climate regime in a fashion as
non-disruptive as is consistent with bringing about an effective and fair solution
to the problem of climate change."
This claim is meant to identify a criterion for assessing a transition to a just
global climate regime. I mention it here since some disagreements reflect
misunderstandings owing to authors talking at cross-purposes. In particular, we
can consider historical emissions relevant in opposite ways when discussing
matters of transition and matters of ideal justice, strengthening and weakening
the claims of the beneficiaries of historical emissions, respectively.
IV. CONCLUSION
In this Article, my aim has been to outline considerations relevant for
specifying an ideally fair way of allocating the mitigation and adaptation costs
associated with climate change, particularly in light of the benefits and damages
brought forth by past emissions. I presuppose a prioritarian theory of
distributive justice and generally proceed by abstracting from the background
inequality existing in the real world. First, I discussed mitigation and conclude
that most people in the developing countries should get higher per capita
emission rights than most in the highly industrialized countries because the
former have fewer benefits associated with past emissions to start with. Finally, I
discussed who should pay adaptation costs and argue that it is difficult to frame
the duty of people in the highly industrialized countries to those who are highly
vulnerable as a duty of compensation but that it should primarily be seen as a
duty grounded in concerns of distributive justice.
4 But see Meyer and Sanklecha, 33 Analyse & Kritik at 467-69 (cited in note 35).
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